Risk assessment for a UK pan-European Supergrid by Eskandari Torbaghan, Mehran et al.
 
 
University of Birmingham
Risk assessment for a UK pan-European Supergrid
Eskandari Torbaghan, Mehran; Burrow, Michael; Hunt, Dexter
DOI:
10.1002/er.3365
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Eskandari Torbaghan, M, Burrow, M & Hunt, D 2015, 'Risk assessment for a UK pan-European Supergrid',
International Journal of Energy Research, vol. 39, no. 11, pp. 1564-1578. https://doi.org/10.1002/er.3365
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Eskandari Torbaghan, M., Burrow, M. P. N., and Hunt, D. V. L. (2015) Risk
assessment for a UK pan-European Supergrid. Int. J. Energy Res., 39: 1564–1578, which has been published in final form at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.3365. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for
Self-Archiving
Checked Jan 2016
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Title: Risk assessment for a UK-Pan European Supergrid 
Abstract 
Interconnected electricity networks, Supergrids, are being considered to help tackle some of 
the current global energy challenges such as rising CO2 emissions and the complete reliance 
on renewables. However, there are a range of obstacles associated with developing 
interconnections, not least the uncertainties associated with selecting appropriate countries 
with which to make interconnection. The process of identifying and then assessing various 
risks for these interconnections can be considered to be an important factor in mitigating and 
controlling their impact from within and outside national and international boundaries.   
To this end, this paper presents a risk-based framework to identify and assess the risks 
associated with developing new interconnections with other countries. Expert’s knowledge 
and information available from the literature were used to identify 19 construction and 11 
maintenance risks and to rank them using a ‘risk’ matrix. The usefulness of the approach is 
demonstrated using the UK as the case study. The analysis of the identified risks showed that 
Regulatory framework, Changes in energy policy and Weak onshore grids require special 
attention and that of those countries considered, Ireland was deemed to have the lowest risk 
for interconnection with the UK.  
1. Introduction 
As part of current and future energy policy a number of countries worldwide are adopting, or 
proposing, policies to encourage the development of cross-border connections for the supply 
of energy. These interconnections, as they will now be referred to, are seen as a viable means 
of tackling some of the obstacles to wider utilisation of renewable energy resources. These 
include, for example, their intermittency, variability and cyclic nature (Chatzivasileiadis et 
al., 2013; Elliott, 2013). In Europe the Supergrid, as it is known, is capable of transmitting 
power from renewable sources using a High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) grid spread 
across the European continents and beyond. The distinct advantage of such a system is that it 
improves the security of energy supply by providing parallel-multiple supply paths 
connecting countries across different time zones, with different electricity generating profiles, 
consumption demands and patterns (Van Hertem and Ghandhari, 2010; Hirschhausen, 2012). 
This offers a distinct array of benefits whereby the Supergrid can reduce the overall cost for 
generating electricity within the whole system thereby decreasing the requirement for other 
sources of spare energy capacity, which tend to be carbon emitting fossil fuels.  
The concept of the European Supergrid is seen as part of the process of creating a single 
carbon reduced market for electricity across European Union member countries (European 
Commission, 2007). In February 2011, the European Council agreed upon an ambitious 
objective to complete the single energy market by 2014, however, due to slow progress by 
member countries, this has been significantly delayed (European Union, 2014). One of the 
barriers to progress is the need for cross-border investment in energy infrastructure including 
the physical interconnections (Brancucci Martínez-Anido et al., 2013; European 
Commission, 2014). Further, the associated decision-making process is often a protracted 
procedure, for example on-going negotiations about developing interconnections have been 
continuing for over 10 years between France and Spain, and the UK and Norway. Part of the 
reason for such lengthy negotiations is because of the uncertainties involved. These include, 
but are not limited to: changes in energy policy of the countries concerned; the availability of 
spare electricity; security of supply issues; the comparatively lengthy construction period and 
the life-time of the physical interconnections.   
Such uncertainties could be addressed via a suitable risk management process that enabled 
for identifying, better understanding and mitigating the potential impacts of risks (Flyvbjerg
et al., 2003; Infrastructure Risk Group, 2013). Appropriate risk assessment in this context 
would create a common language between all engaging countries that would help resolve 
disputes and shape a set of common priorities, thereby facilitating the overall decision-
making process (Linkov and Ramadan, 2006).  
This paper describes the use of a risk assessment procedure that is adopted in order to tackle 
one of the major issues associated with any Supergrid, in other words the process ‘for 
identifying suitable partner countries with which to make an interconnection with in order to 
enable renewal energy to be imported’.
Early stage risk-assessment can significantly reduce the cost of projects by restricting 
unnecessary spend, especially with contingencies allocated for cost uncertainty 
(Infrastructure Risk Group, 2013). However, a major challenge of carrying out a risk analysis 
for the process of constructing interconnections is obtaining reliable information (in terms of 
identifying risks, and then assessing their likelihood of occurrence and impact) because such 
construction projects are essentially one-off enterprises (Flanagan and Norman, 1993). To 
overcome this an established methodological approach is to make use of knowledge obtained 
from a diverse range of experts in the field, who are well versed in terms of experience, 
judgment and application of rules-of-thumb (Dikmen et al., 2007). Accordingly this paper 
utilizes such expert opinion and enables early stage risk assessment to be undertaken in the 
appraisal stage of a project. The innovative methodology presented herein focuses on risk 
identification and assessment of related impacts using a range of experts’ opinion, the process 
is demonstrated by considering interconnections between countries in continental Europe and 
the UK. 
2. Risk assessment and its implication for interconnections 
A number of approaches to deal with uncertainty associated with energy related projects are 
described in the literature, see for example Song et al. (2013) and Kearns et al. (2012).  
However, literature dealing specifically with the risks and uncertainties of interconnections is 
less well developed. An exception is the study described by Parail (2010b) where 
interconnections are considered in terms of an economic risk associated with electricity 
trading on financial markets. Unfortunately it does not take into account other uncertainties 
such as those associated with social, technical, environmental and political factors. A 
shortfall which this paper aims to fill. Understanding the construction and maintenance risks 
of an interconnection requires comprehending their causes, and likelihoods and consequences 
of occurrence to adopt appropriate mitigation measures. In conventional risk assessment these 
are typically considered as part of a framework which consist of three main processes namely 
(BSI, 2010);  
1. risk identification, (Section 3.2) 
2. semi-quantification (Section 3.3) and  
3. quantification.  
Risk identification is the process of finding, recognising and recording risks whilst semi-
quantification and quantification stages are about determining the consequences and 
likelihood of occurrence for identified risk events.  
In the case of interconnections, the identified risks are directly related to, or influenced by, 
project complexity, construction time (up to 10 years for some seabed interconnections), the 
duration of asset use (40 years or more), and the involvement of various industries and 
stakeholders. An interconnection project is notoriously risky because two countries are 
involved, each with their own energy related policies and associated politics (Eskandari 
Torbaghan et al., 2014).  
3. Interconnection risk assessment process  
The early stage risk assessment process developed herein, utilizes expert opinion to facilitate 
the identification and assessment of risks for establishing interconnections between the UK 
and continental Europe and consists of 3 principal stages, i) Initial screening, ii) risk 
identification, and iii) risk semi-quantification. These are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The methodology of study including the risk assessment stages 
3.1 Initial screening 
An initial screening exercise was undertaken by which unsuitable countries were identified 
and excluded from further analysis. This process, described further by Eskandari Torbaghan 
et al. (2014), takes into account political, economic, environmental and social factors to 
identify candidate countries. Accordingly, 9 feasible candidate countries for interconnection 
with the UK were identified, these are: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Spain and Ireland.  
3.2 Risk identification 
The risk identification stage is the process of finding and recognising risks by identifying the 
circumstances that might affect the availability and security of interconnections and 
importing electricity (BSI, 2010).  
Initially, an extensive literature review was undertaken to identify the most prominent risks 
and thereafter this was augmented by canvassing the opinion of a group of experts, through a 
series of structured interviews. In total over one hundred experts from continental Europe, 
who have specialist skills and knowledge in electricity generation and distribution, were 
contacted through email correspondence. Of these 20 agreed to partake in the research, 
representing 8 different countries. These included those working in electricity generating and 
distribution companies, design engineering consultants, academic researchers of note in their 
field (including energy policy specialists, electrical power engineers and economists), policy 
makers and government advisors. The respondents were subsequently grouped into 5 broad 
categories: Academia, Grid operators, Government advisors, Private developers and 
Suppliers as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Breakdown of Experts consulted according to country (a) and Category (b) 
Countries 
Number of 
participants 
Category 
Number of 
participants
UK 9 Academia 8 
Netherlands 2 
Grid operator 4 
Italy 1 
Belgium 3 Government 
advisor 
5 
Sweden 1 
Ireland 2 
Private developer 2 
Germany 1 
France 1 Supplier 1 
(a)                                                            (b) 
To facilitate the risk identification process, two main categories were adopted; construction 
and operation. These were further broken down into 5 sub-categories that depict drivers of 
change, namely: social, technical, economic, environmental and political (STEEP). A total of 
30 risks related to new interconnection were identified (19 associated with construction and 
11 with operation. These are summarised in tables 2a and 2b respectively.  
3.2.1 Considered risks 
Further analysis related to the identified risks was carried out, prior to the risk semi-
quantification stage, in order to identify those to be included for further analysis. Only those 
considered to be different between any of the countries, in terms of either their impact or 
probability of occurrence, were included. 
Table 2.a Identified risk associated with the construction of an interconnection  
Risk category Identified risk Risk description Risk Impact Primary sources Suggested sources of information 
Social Public acceptability 
Public reaction to the investment in making an 
interconnection and/or its environmental impacts  
The cost of running a protracted 
enquiry, negative publicity, 
coverage and the possibility of 
potential cable route change 
Expert opinion 
Technical 
a. Loss of Dynamic 
Positioning (DP)  
Storms, excessively large waves or currents may prevent 
the cable laying vessel from keeping its position 
Increasing the time and therefore 
the cost of laying power cables  
Worzyk (2009) 
b. Earthquake 
Earthquake might cause seabed displacement induced by 
fault movement, submarine landslides and seabed soil 
liquefaction  
Cost of adoption of earthquake 
resistant construction methods and 
cables. 
Aiwen (2009) Simkin et al. (2006) for Hot spots 
c. Anchoring damages, 
kinks and loading/re-
loading 
Risks related to installation and cable laying procedure 
Extra costs of cable installation and 
delay 
Worzyk (2009) 
d. Seabed topography 
Existence of boulder fields and a rocky / irregular seabed 
can raise the cost of the required cable trenching.  
Cost of conducting an analysis of 
the seabed and appropriate 
measures to avoid or deal with the 
effect of the rocky seabed 
Expert opinion MESH (2014) for seabed map 
e. Seabed contamination 
Oil and gas fields are sources of underwater 
contamination   
Cost of cleaning or avoiding Liang et al.(2009) 
DECC (2014) for UK offshore 
infrastructures 
f. Unforeseen ship wrecks 
and other submarine 
debris 
The presence of large ship wrecks may necessitate a 
change in the proposed route for the cable  
Cost of removing or avoiding Expert opinion  
European Marine Observation 
and Data Network (2011) for map 
g.  Unforeseen sea depths  
Unpredicted sea depths during the installation or the 
need to conduct additional  measurements due to the 
existence of unmapped zones 
Additional cost during installation 
and/or design of the cables 
Expert opinion 
h. Weak onshore grids 
Weaker infrastructure at the connection points to the 
grids might lead to further costs to upgrade the system  
Increase in construction cost 
Expert opinion, 
(Ayodele et al., 
2012; Ibrahim et 
al., 2012) 
i.  Regulatory framework  
Differing regulatory frameworks between the UK and a 
candidate country 
Additional costs required to 
introduce an entity or vehicle to 
operate the new interconnection 
Expert opinion 
Hendriks et al.(2010) for 
literature review 
j.  Marine activities  
Fishing nets or anchors can lead to seabed cable failure.  
This may require heavily fished areas or busy sea lanes 
to be avoided or special mitigation measures to be put in 
place  
Cost of mitigation or avoidance  
(CIGRÉ, 2009; 
Karlsdóttir, 2013) 
International Maritime 
Organization (2013) for 
regulations, European 
Commission (2011) for map of 
activities 
Economic 
a. Uncertainty in cost 
estimation (quantity and 
rates) 
Since building interconnections is a relatively 
uncommon activity few companies will have had the 
experience of being involved in such projects. Cost 
estimation amongst bidders could therefore be expected 
to be exaggerated since the risk to company in terms of 
unknowns is high.   
Increase in construction cost Flyvbjerg (2006) 
ENTSO-E (2012) for list of 
existing interconnections 
b. Supply chain; 
contractor 
Lack of competition between contractors (see item a 
above) 
Direct increase in construction cost Expert opinion 
c. Solvency of contractor  Contracting firm becomes insolvent Time delay costs Expert opinion 
Eurostat (2013b) for European 
countries financial data 
d. Inflated bid price Due to uniqueness of job  Increase in construction cost Narayanan (1999) 
e. Capital and material 
costs 
Capital and material costs may increase during the 
project abnormally due to economic and political factors.  
Increase in construction cost 
Decker et al. 
(2011) 
Environmental 
a. Disturbing habitats and 
ecosystems  
Cost of mitigation or avoidance (long term impacts) Increase in construction cost 
Van den Hove et 
al (2007) 
b. Climate change 
Cost of studies to identify possible impacts of   climate 
change  (e.g. on currents; direction and strength and 
waves) and associated measures to mitigate against them 
Increase in construction cost 
(predesign phase) 
Expert opinion 
Political 
Changes in energy policy 
of target country 
Changes in energy policy or government by the 
candidate country may lead to the imposition of higher 
taxes or charges  
Increase in energy cost Expert opinion 
Table 2.b Identified risk associated with the operation of an interconnection 
Risk category Identified risk Risk description Risk Impact Primary sources 
Suggested sources for data 
collection 
Social 
Demonstrations 
caused by an increase 
in the  price energy 
In the event of energy becoming more expensive, there is a 
risk that public demonstrations could occur in both countries 
involved  
Imposing a financial restriction on 
operation and or maintenance cost 
Expert opinion 
Parail (2010a) on impacts of 
interconnections on electricity 
prices 
Technical 
a.  Availability of 
electricity from 
renewable resources 
The risk depends on the energy generating characteristic of 
both the source and target countries taking into account the 
intermittency of renewables.  There is also a risk that  
national governments may not  export energy at times of high 
domestic demand and low supply (political risk) 
Power blackouts in importing 
country  
Expert opinion 
b.  Earthquake Maintenance of minor damage   Expert opinion 
c.  Marine activities  Fishing gear or anchors can lead to seabed cables failures Maintenance costs   
(CIGRÉ, 2009; 
Karlsdóttir, 2013) 
International Maritime 
Organization (2013) for 
regulations, European 
Commission (2011) for map of 
activities 
e.  Weak onshore 
grids 
Weak infrastructure at the connection points to the grids can 
lead to loss of electricity   
Loss of income due to electricity 
loss 
Expert’s opinion 
and also (Ayodele
et al., 2012; 
Ibrahim et al., 
2012) 
Environmental 
a. Disturbing 
habitats and 
ecosystems  
Cost of avoiding disturbing existing or  new habitats formed 
in the vicinity of  cables during maintenance 
Increase in maintenance cost caused 
by mitigating the impact of 
maintenance on the habitats 
Expert opinion 
b. Climate 
Change 
Maintenance to infrastructure required to repair damaged 
caused by severe waves or currents 
Increased maintenance costs   Expert opinion 
(Nelson et al., 2009; Greenberg et 
al., 2012) about impacts on 
oceans currents and tides 
Economic 
a. Increase in 
prices of imported 
electricity 
Caused by changes in energy policy or Customer Duty with a 
direct impact on the price of electricity and decrease in 
interconnection revenue 
loss of profit Expert opinion 
Eurostat (2013a) on electricity 
price history 
b. Competition 
between 
interconnections 
The new interconnections built in the future between the 
exporting country and another country may have an impact 
on the availability of RE and also its cost relative to other 
sources of electricity  
Reduction in the return on 
investment of the interconnection 
Expert opinion 
Parail (2010b) and Decker et al. 
(2011) on the economic impacts 
of the new interconnections on 
the existing one 
Political 
a. Changes in 
energy policy 
Changes in policy by respective governments may lead to 
potential reductions in electricity exported or imported  
Shortage of imported electricity, 
with a consequential increase in 
electricity price 
Expert opinion 
b. Security of 
renewable 
energy 
supply 
The political instability of energy producing countries, 
manipulation of energy supplies and terrorism 
Shortage of imported electricity, 
with an associated increase in 
electricity price, blackout, increased 
costs of maintenance and increased 
security costs 
Wesley (2007) 
Battaglini et al. (2010) on 
countries as reliable electricity 
supply 
Those with similar impacts or probabilities for all considered countries were not included 
since they would not affect the identification of the country with the lowest risk. Nevertheless 
their identification is important since they can be used for individual risk assessment for each 
country. The selected risks are shown in Table 3. For example, “Security of renewable energy 
supply” was not considered further as its impact and probability was considered to be very 
similar for the countries considered. 
Table 3. List of considered risks for further analysis 
Construction risks 
Social Public acceptability 
Technical 
a.    Loss of Dynamic Positioning (DP)  
b.    Earthquakes 
c.    Seabed topography 
d.    Seabed contamination 
e.    Unforeseen ship wrecks and other submarine junk  
f.    Unforeseen sea depth 
g.    Weak onshore grids 
h.    Regulatory framework  
i.    Marine activities  
Economic 
a.    Uncertainty in cost estimation (quantity and rates) 
b.    Supply chain; contractor 
c.    Solvency of contractor  
d.    Inflated bid price 
e.    Cost of material 
Environmental 
a.    Disturbing habitats and ecosystems  
b.    Climate change 
Political Changes in energy policy of target country 
Operational risks 
Social Demonstrations caused by raised price 
Technical 
a.    Availability of electricity from renewable resources 
b.    Earthquake 
c.    Marine activities  
e.    Weak onshore grids 
Environmental 
a.    Disturbing habitats and ecosystems  
b.    Climate Change 
Economic Increase in prices of imported electricity 
3.3 Risk Semi-quantification 
The base measure of risk (Equation 1) was used to evaluate respective impacts and 
probabilities of occurrence (BSI, 2010): 
  	

          (1) 
Impacts and probabilities were obtained after consultation with the 20 experts who were 
asked to rate the impact and probability of each of the risks in Table 3 on an integer scale 
from 1 to 5, with each integer representing a range of possible values as shown in Figure 2. 
The probability and impact were determined by taking the average response from the experts 
consulted. This is directly in line with current risk analysis practice when using expert 
opinion (BSI, 2010).   
The resulting matrix of possible risks, determined according to Equation 1, is shown in 
Figure 2.  Scores of 15 or greater were considered to be ‘high risk’, those equal or greater 
than 5 but less than 13 were considered to be ‘medium risk’, whilst scores less than 5 were 
assumed to be ‘low risk’.  
Figure 2. Example of the Risk matrix used in semi-quantification stage 
4. Results 
Table 4 shows for each identified risk scores the scores obtained for the 9 countries 
considered according to ‘Construction Risks’ (i to xvii) and ‘Operational Risks’ (xviii to 
xxvi). It can be seen that of the 234 possible identified risk-country combinations, around 
68% have low risk scores, 32% have medium risk scores and 0% have high risk scores.  
High risk
Medium risk
Low risk
Table 4. Results of semi-quantification stage for the candidate countries 
RISK TYPE
COUNTRY 
AVERAGE 
Norway Sweden Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands Belgium Ireland France 
i. Public acceptability 5 5 4 5 6 5 3 5 6 5 
ii. DP 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
iii. Earthquake 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
iv. Seabed topography 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 
v. Seabed contamination 3 4 2 3 3 4 3 1 2 3 
vi. Ship wrecks 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 
vii. Unforeseen sea depth 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 1 
viii. Weak onshore grids 5 8 5 7 7 8 8 5 7 7 
ix. Regulatory framework 6 9 8 8 8 8 10 10 9 8 
x. Marine activities 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 4 6 4 
xi. Cost estimation 7 8 9 6 6 6 5 6 7 7 
xii.  Supply chain 4 4 4 4 3 2 3 2 2 3 
xiii.  Solvency of contractor 1 2 5 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 
xiv.  Inflated bid price 5 5 6 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 
xv. Cost of material 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 
xvi. Disturbing habitats 6 5 3 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 
xvii. Climate change 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 
xviii. Changes in energy policy 8 8 9 7 9 9 8 7 10 8 
xix. Demonstrations 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 
xx. Availability of electricity 4 4 8 4 6 7 5 2 6 5 
xxi. Earthquake 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
xxii. Marine activities 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 
xxiii. Climate Change 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 
xxiv.  Weak onshore grids 4 5 5 4 8 5 5 7 3 5 
xxv. Disturbing habitats 4 5 4 5 3 3 3 2 3 4 
xxvi.  Increased electricity prices 6 2 7 6 7 7 6 5 5 6 
SUM 91 100 104 90 99 95 92 80 95 
G: Low Risk  Y: Medium Risk    R: High Risk
The highest individual risk scores are associated with the regulatory framework (ix in list, 
with Ireland and Belgium each scoring 10) and changes in energy policy risk (xviii in list, 
with France a scoring 10).   
Assuming risks had an equal weighting they were summed down columns to give a total risk 
for each country (Section 4.1) and averaged across rows to find a measure for Risk Type 
(Section 4.2).   
4.1 Risk by Country 
Figure 3 shows total risks according to each country - ranked in order from highest to lowest. 
Figure 3. Risk by Country (Ranked in order) 
When considering interconnections with the UK, Spain was found to pose the greatest overall 
risk (i.e. sum for column = 104), whilst Ireland posed the lowest overall risk (i.e. sum for 
column = 80) - suggesting strongly that Ireland could be considered as a preferential country 
for the UK to make an interconnection with, whilst Spain is the least preferred. Much of the 
reasoning for this is related to its proximity to the UK and the relatively well mapped ocean 
(the Irish Sea) between the two countries highlighted with low risk scores associated with the 
sea or seabed (i.e. iv to vii in Table 4). In addition to the comparatively short distance 
between Ireland and the UK (Table 5), its energy and distributing system is similar to the UK 
and therefore it has low risk scores associated with “increased electricity prices (xxvi in Table 
4)” and “changes in energy policy (xviii in Table 4)”. 
Table 5. Identified countries and their proximity to the UK 
Countries Min distance to 
the UK (km)
1 Sweden 800
2 Spain 700
3 Denmark 580
4 Norway 460
5 Germany 380
6 Netherlands 170
7 Belgium 98
8 Ireland 85
a
9 France 40
a) Distance by sea 
Conversely the comparatively large distance (Table 5) and expanse of ocean between Spain 
and the UK is a major factor in highest risk ranking (Figure 4). The distance between Sweden 
and the UK, which is the largest of the countries considered, is also a major factor and 
contributes towards it having the second highest total risk score of 100 (Table 4 and Figure 
3).  
Whilst France is the closest country to the UK an interconnection between the two countries 
has the 4
th
 highest risk score. This is because the socio-political environment in France was 
considered by the experts to be more volatile than in any of the other 8 countries.  For 
example, risks associated with ‘public acceptability’, ‘the regulatory framework’, and 
‘changes in energy policy’ (6, 9, and 10 respectively) are the highest, or amongst the highest, 
of all countries considered (Table 4).  
Nevertheless, whilst most of the identified risks are either low or medium, the fact that the 
UK currently does not have any under construction interconnection with any other country, 
despite an identified need, and the ongoing protracted negotiations (see section 2) suggests 
that regulatory and changes in energy policy risks are perhaps the most influential risks as far 
as decision makers are concerned. 
4.2 Risk by Type 
Figure 4 shows average risks (by type) ranked in order from highest to lowest. 
Figure 4. Risk by type (Ranked in order) 
In terms of the ‘construction category’ it can be seen that the highest average risk scores (i.e. 
8 - medium risk) are held jointly for ‘changes in energy policy’ and ‘regulatory framework’ 
In terms of the operational risk category ‘increased electricity prices’ receives the highest 
average score (i.e. 6 - medium risk).  This is related to various external influences such as 
daily and hourly auctioning. This is not surprising as existing electricity trading system cause 
uncertainties related to the pricing of electricity, and these are exacerbated where 
interconnections exist. This risk can be better controlled through adoption of fixed pricing 
strategies (i.e. via long term contracts).      
Key Risks are those that may require mitigation measures to reduce their probability of 
occurrence and or impact. Unfortunately there is no widely recognised system to identify 
such key risks. Therefore by using the risk ranking process described (and given that no risk 
was ranked as high) it was decided that for the purpose of this work ‘key risks’ were those 
with an average score of 5 or greater (indicated by those located above the dashed line in 
Figure 4).   These top seven risks are discussed further below in their respective ranked order.   
4.2.1. Changes in energy policy (construction) 
It is not surprising to see this as the top ranked risk. In part because any change in energy 
policy of the exporting country may impact the availability of renewable energy and can 
threaten the feasibility of a project during inception. This may be caused through the pressure 
of public opinion (see 4.2.7), such as has happened in Germany after the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster in Japan which has caused Germany to adopt policies that sort to reduce its nuclear 
energy capability. The knock-on effect of Germany’s new energy policy is that it has less 
available renewable energy to export because of the necessity to use it to replace nuclear 
energy sources. Consequently we see that Germany, in terms of energy policy risk, was 
assessed as having one of the highest risk scores (Figure 3 and Table 4).   
In addition it is not inappropriate to assume that the imposition of new energy policies might 
also lead to higher taxes or charges on exports for that country therefore increasing the cost to 
the UK. The risk is identified as comparatively high for all the countries considered (with risk 
scores of between 7-10) with France being the highest ranked, and Ireland and Denmark the 
lowest. Interviews with experts revealed that “the history of France of not completing 
interconnection projects” was the main reason for it being considered the most risky. 
Conversely, “the similarity in energy policies” between Ireland and the UK was the reason 
why experts considered it to have the lowest risk associated with regards to energy policy 
(Table 4).   
4.2.2. Regulatory framework (construction) 
Different existing regulatory frameworks between countries forming a new interconnection, 
requires the introduction of a joint organisation to build that interconnection. This of itself is 
logistically complex causing delays and additional costs when trying to obtain the required 
approvals. The underground Eurotunnel crossing can be cited as an example of a physical 
interconnection between countries which highlights such delays (almost 50 years in this 
case). In the pan-European transmission system this is being addressed by the development of 
a unified regulatory framework of national and regional grid codes, which take into account 
grid connection charging methods (Hendriks et al., 2010). However, due to dissimilarities in 
the existing regulatory frameworks in these countries the interdependency between technical 
(e.g. voltage, and regulatory aspects in Europe a complete accomplishment of a unified 
framework) has yet to be achieved (Hendriks et al., 2010).  
As far as the regulatory framework is concerned, the risk analysis scored all of the candidate 
countries similarly (with risk scores of 8 to10 excepting Norway with 6.  
4.2.3. Cost estimation (construction) 
A major source of risk in any project is the inaccurate forecasting of projected costs and 
construction duration and therefore the predictions of benefits vs costs can be inappropriately 
judged (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Generally, those countries with a high number of existing 
interconnections could be regarded to have the least cost estimation risk since they are likely 
to be the most experienced within this field and more than able to provide an appropriate 
amount of historical data for the estimation. Table 6 shows the number of seabed 
interconnections for the nine countries considered in this study (see ENTSO-E, (2012)), from 
which it can be seen that on this basis Sweden and Denmark should have the least cost 
estimation risk as they each have seven existing interconnections and three under 
construction, whilst Belgium with no current interconnections could be considered the most 
risky.   
Table 6. Number of seabed interconnections for nine candidate countries 
Country Number of seabed 
interconnection 
Comments 
Sweden 10 Including 3 under construction 
Denmark 10 Including 3 under construction 
Spain 7 Including 5 under construction 
Norway 4 Including 1 under construction 
Germany 3 Including 1 under construction 
France 3 - 
Netherlands 2 - 
Ireland 0 1 Under construction 
Belgium 0 - 
Interestingly however nearly all experts when interviewed suggested that Belgium and Spain 
were the least and highest risks countries respectively. This is surprising given that Belgium 
currently has no interconnections, however the experts’ suggested that the ranking reflected 
the country’s “good reputation in the energy sector”. As for the Spain, the distance between 
it and the UK, (it is the second longest as mentioned above) as well as the “financial 
instability” of Spain’s economy were the reasons for the experts assigning it the highest cost 
risk. 
4.2.4. Weak onshore grids (construction and operation) 
Connection points are usually located away from the main areas of population where access 
to a strong grid, with required physical properties (e.g. voltage to connect with the 
interconnection), is limited. It is well known that weaker infrastructure at the connection 
points can lead to additional cost requirements in order to upgrade the grid to avoid the risk 
of losing the entire capacity which might threaten the network stability (Ibrahim et al., 2012). 
Voltage fluctuation due to load fluctuation in a weak grid can be magnified which can 
aggravate the power quality problem (Ayodele et al., 2012). Improving the grid at a 
connection point including construction of new grid is capital intensive but may often be 
unavoidable. Hence the fact that this is the fourth highest risk is not surprising. The analysis 
suggests that Sweden, Netherlands and Belgium are perceived to be the most risky in terms of 
proving access to a strong grid. ENTSO-E (2012) provides information on the existing, under 
construction and planned electricity infrastructure for all European countries. From this 
source of information, Table 7 shows the number of existing grid connection points, in each 
candidate country, located on a coastline facing the UK.  Assuming this is an indicator of 
strong connecting points for a new interconnection it can be seen therein that Sweden and 
Belgium could be considered to be the least appropriate a fact which has been corroborated 
by the findings of the experts (Table 4).  
Table 7. Number of interconnections and grid branches facing the UK for nine candidate countries 
Country Number of connection 
points 
France >10 
Spain >10 
Norway 6 
Netherlands 4 
Germany 4 
Ireland 4 
Denmark 3 
Sweden 2 
Belgium 1 
Spain, Norway and Ireland were identified as being the least risky by the experts which, for 
certainly the former two countries, is confirmed by the information given in Table 7. The 
overriding reasons for excluding France have already been mentioned in 4.2.1. 
4.2.5. Increase in imported electricity prices (construction) 
The impacts of any increase in prices of the exported electricity can be significant on 
electricity consumers in the importing country. Not least because a historical (i.e. previous 10 
years) look at electricity pricing of the candidate country can be used as an indicator of the 
future price rises of its electricity. The electricity prices for household consumers of the nine 
considered countries over a 12 year period are shown in Figure 5, from which it may be seen 
that Ireland has experienced the greatest increase (approximately 130%), whilst Norway has 
had the greatest fluctuation in price over this period. Although the prices shown in Figure 5 
concern the domestic market, and in some countries the cost may be subsidised by the tax 
payer, they still may be regarded as a useful indication of energy prices across the patch.  
However, the experts on the contrary considered that Sweden (Table 4) was the least risky in 
terms of future increases in electricity cost, whilst France was rated as the 2nd country with a 
comparatively high score of 5. Spain, Germany and Netherlands were considered to be the 
riskiest countries with an average risk score of 7. This shows the importance of compiling 
both historical information and expert opinion before decisions are made.  
Figure 5. Electricity price history for 9 candidate countries and the UK (€ / kWh) (Eurostat, 2013a) 
4.2.6. Availability of electricity from renewable resources (operation)  
This risk depends greatly on the energy generating characteristic(s) of the target country and 
considers the intermittency of renewable supplies. For example, importing electricity from a 
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country which relies primarily on wind to generate electricity may be considered risky as 
there is no guarantee for supply when of the availability of wind power is highly variable. A 
more diverse supply stream might be considered less risky in this respect. 
On this basis, Table 4 shows Ireland (with a risk score of 2), and Spain, (with a risk score of 
8), as the lowest and highest ranked countries in terms of availability of supply from 
renewables. This is not surprising since Spain obtains a large proportion (around 40% 
(MINETUR, 2011)) of its energy from both hydroelectric and wind power and is likely to 
replace (or at the very least supplement) much of its hydroelectricity capacity with solar 
energy in the future (Energynautics GmbH, 2011), thereby, providing a measure of diversity. 
Notwithstanding, Spain’s future energy policy associated with developing renewables in the 
future is identified as the main reason for selecting the country as the riskiest by the experts 
(Section 4.2.1).  
4.2.7. Public acceptability (construction) 
Public acceptability regarding the investment in making an interconnection and also its 
environmental impacts are sources of uncertainty for the project. The possible impact can be 
the cost of running a public enquiry, negative publicity and media coverage and could result 
in a potential cable route change. For example, public demonstrations that occurred to protest 
against the environmental impacts of Westernlink (an interconnection being built between 
Western Scotland and the North Wales) caused the relocation of 4km cable. 
According to the experts the public acceptability risk is lowest for Belgium with a score of 3, 
whilst Germany, which has “a strong public energy lobby”, and France, which appears 
“reticent to develop interconnections”, have the highest score of 6.  
5.   Concluding Discussion 
This paper has presented a risk based framework for identifying the most appropriate country 
(ies) with which to make grid interconnections and from which to import renewable 
electricity. It consisted of: 
(1) an initial screening process to identify countries to be excluded from further analysis,  
(2) a risk identification process to identify threats associated with both building 
interconnections and importing electricity, and  
(3) a risk semi-quantification stage which consisted of determining consequences and 
probabilities of occurrence to define a level of risk.  
The methodology was demonstrated using the UK as a case study and by considering 9 
potential host countries. This helped showcase the inherent need for such a tool and 
highlighted the benefits in terms of informed decision-making that can be reaped. As the 
developed methodology can be used for building new interconnections it is directly relevant 
for any country, organisation and or company from public or private sectors to identify the 
most appropriate country to connect with. This becomes readily apparent when it is used to 
identify the highest and lowest potential risks associated with construction and operation.  
As far as the risk identification process is concerned, the opinion of a group of experts was 
canvassed to identify the risks. As adopted within this risk assessment methodology this 
should be considered as a precursor within any risk analysis work and should occur in the 
initial stages of the project. The results obtained however will ultimately depend upon the 
range and quality of the experts considered, in our case we would suggest both diverse and 
high.  
When applying risk quantification, our analysis identified that Spain is potentially ‘most 
risky’ and Ireland ‘least risky’ country for the UK to form an interconnection Spain is ranked 
as the most risky country because of uncertainties in its regulatory framework, cost 
estimation, changes in energy policy and availability of electricity, whereas Ireland was 
shown to be least risky because of relatively low risks associated with seabed contamination, 
environmental impacts, changes in energy policy and availability of electricity. The second 
most appropriate country identified is Norway, with its vast supply of renewable 
hydroelectricity and confirms why it already has established interconnections with other 
countries (e.g. with the Netherlands (NorNed)).  
In terms of the individual risks, 8 were identified as ‘key risks’, in other words those which 
may require special mitigation measures to be undertaken. Of these ‘regulatory framework’ 
and ‘changes in energy policy’ have the highest average scores and arguably these two 
politically associated risks may be the main reasons why the UK has yet to establish a new 
energy interconnection. To address this it is recommended that a pre-study phase in any 
interconnection project should address any possible differences associated with the energy 
regulators in each country, in advance and as part of appraisal phase, so that a mutually 
acceptable framework for the electricity trading can be established at an early stage. As for 
the energy policy especially regarding the willingness for developing interconnections, and to 
avoid the current protracted procedures for governmental approvals, engagement of the 
private sector, through mechanisms such as public private partnerships (PPPs) can facilitate 
the procedure by providing know how, capital and by reducing some of the risk from the 
public sector. Furthermore, future changes in energy policy might threaten the availability of 
tradable renewable electricity. Nevertheless the current trend for developing renewables 
seems to address this risk and arguably reduce its probability. Engagement of the private 
sector in developing renewables may also reduce the probability of this risk occurring and 
may even enhance the development of interconnections to provide a larger market for 
renewables.    
The risk semi-quantification process described herein can be regarded as a first, albeit 
important stage in analysing the risks associated with interconnections.  It is recognised that 
further refinement of the modelling process is both desirable and necessary. To this end 
future development of the model will include a refined quantification process, consideration 
of the relative weights of the identified risks (rather than identical weightages as considered 
here), with perhaps more weighting given to political risks, and consultation with a wider 
pool of experts. 
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